Testimony : between the inside and the outside of language by Majewski, Tomasz
 Teksty Drugie 2014, 2, s. 30-41              
Special Issue
Testimony: Between the Inside and 





30 n o n f i c t i o n ,  r e p o r t a g e  a n d  t e s t i m o n y
Tomasz Majewski
Testimony: Between the Inside 
and the Outside of Language1
1 .
The issue I w ould like to explore here is the linguistic 
status of testim ony as form ulated by Giorgio Agam ben. 
I w ill not analyze testim ony as a separate sort o f discur­
sive practice, neither w ill I explore the question o f  the 
perform ative character o f sim ilar forms of expression or 
delve into the pragm atic consequences o f the act o f te s­
tim ony (extensively exam ined by the liked o f Shoshana 
Felm an and Dori Laub). The paper w ill also disregard the 
issue of belief, written or spoken accounts, predicates and 
referencing these forms of expression. Agam ben's delib­
erations are of particular interest to m e given their focus 
on abandoning the widespread conviction that testim ony 
weighed after the Holocaust refers to unnam able and in ­
tangible realities outside the realm  of language, while the 
act o f bearing w itness of the Shoah would be an extreme 
case o f the act o f speech. A gam ben treats the notion of 
im possib ility  o f  speaking advanced b y  p sychoanalyti­
cal discourse seriously, thus linking it w ith  the em pirical
1 The pap er is an exten d ed  version  o f  th e  lectu re  g iven a t th e  34 th T h e­
ory o f  L iterature C on feren ce  L iterary R epresenta tions o f  Experience, 
held in S e p te m b e r o f  2006 in G d an sk -So b ieszew o .
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fact o f testim onies com ing into being, their linguistic existence. The realized 
em bodim ent o f the im possible is, in  A gam ben's perspective, m ore w orthy 
o f  attention that the recurring th esis positing the in expressib ility  o f lim i- 
nal experiences. Testim onies exist, they w ere given, and language w as used 
to convey w hat once w as thought im possible to recount. A s a result, w e can­
not explore the issues revolving around the concept o f testim ony w ithout 
reexam ining the problem  of language/speech and without investigating how 
the realization of such im possible expressions affects the issue o f language. 
From  the linguistic perspective, language reveals its aporetic character, h id­
den in its quotidian usage. We w ill not grasp “w hat” testim ony speaks about 
until w e come to understand w hat it m eans in their case to, as Celan put it, 
“just speak.” Agam ben writes:
In this language, a language that survives the subjects who spoke it coin­
cides w ith  a speaker who rem ains beyond it. ... so the speech o f the w itness 
bears w itn ess to a tim e in  w hich  hum an beings did not y e t speak; and so 
the testim ony o f hum an beings attests to a tim e in  w hich they were not yet 
hum an.2 (162)
Agam ben's thesis, whose shape I w ill be following herein, would, at least 
in  m y opinion, argue the following: if  the structure of testim ony is based on 
realizing the radical im possibility of expression experienced by someone who 
is “capable o f  speaking,” as w ell as on the relationship betw een the hum an 
and the inhum an, then the crack at its heart w ill not be the lim it, but rather 
a hidden principle o f the existence o f language.
In 1964, during an interview aired by the Germ an TV  channel ZDF, Günter 
Gaus asked Hannah Arendt whether something has remained in her innermost 
personal experience o f pre-Nazi Europe: “W hat rem ains? The mother tongue 
remains (Was bleibt? Es bleibt die Muttersprache.)’’ Not m em ories o f events or even 
fully-form ed personalities but language, both m edium  and m essage, is what 
remains after the identity o f its speaker perishes. What, then, is that language- 
rem nant -  asks Giorgio A gam ben in reference to A rendts reply -  w hat does 
it m ean to speak a language that's alm ost entirely a relic, and how  can a lan­
guage survive its speakers? In his desire to reexamine the issue of bearing w it­
ness, the articulation o f experience, and the linguistic structure of testimony, 
the author o f the Homo Sacer triptych sketches, it its final installm ent, Quel che 
resta di Auschwitz? (Remnants o f Auschwitz), an image of language as a field where 
anom ie clashes w ith norm, innovation clashes with conservative tendencies 
inherent in the grammatical system, in which the point where tensions intersect
2 G. A gam b en , R em nants o f  Auschw itz: The W itness and the A rch ive  (N ew  York: Zone Books, 
2002). U nless sta te d  o th erw ise , from  here on w ards th e  location s o f  all th e  q u o tes  from  this 
book will be p laced  in th e  m ain body o f  the article.
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determines, as structural locus, the position of the speaking subject, i.e. the place 
of those who, as Agam ben puts it, decide what can and cannot be said, therefore 
decide not only the semantics o f their own speech, but also, if  taken to an ex­
treme, adjudicate as to what is expressible in language and what is not.
The end o f this dialectic o f the expression and the expressed, the express­
ible and the inexpressible, anom ie and the norm  w ould m ean the death o f 
language brought about by abrogation o f the prospects for the emergence of 
the subject o f speech. Language dies w hen the relationship betw een “norm ” 
(Dante's grammatica -  scholastic Latin) and anom ie (the void o f unnam ed 
experience) breaks down in the subject, thus transforming langue into a “whole 
that is closed and lacking all exteriority” into a corpus o f realized, fulfilled 
statem ents. “We thus say o f a dead language that it is no longer spoken, that 
is, that in  it it is im possible to assign the position o f a subject.” (160) For the 
author speaking a dead language, assigning him self such a position would sig­
nify a mom ent in which, as Agam ben writes, this “curious auctor, who author­
izes an absolute im possib ility o f speaking and sum m ons it to speech,” thus 
paradoxically giving “his voice and blood to the shadow  o f a dead language, 
so that it m ay return -  as such -  to speech.” (161) This isolated act, typical for 
the literary praxis o f Latin poets, makes it possible for language to survive the 
death o f its subjects; its transm ission, however, takes place via  the corpus of 
what has been said or is evoked by the archive's records, which still does not 
m ake it a living language. In this particular case, the “archive” is neither the 
dust of the libraries nor the collections contained within, but rather an assort­
m ent o f rules that define the event o f discourse -  its emergence. According 
to Foucault, from  w hom  Agam ben borrowed the term, it situates itself in the 
sphere o f casual determ inants, in the historical reality betw een pure langue 
understood as a system  of constructing possible sentences and the corpus col­
lecting what has already been said. The archive, the “m ass of the non-sem antic 
inscribed in every m eaningful discourse as a function of its enunciation” is 
only the “m argin encircling and lim iting every concrete act o f speech,” while 
being “the unsaid or sayable inscribed in everything said by virtue o f being 
enunciated” (143-444). Foucault calls th is record o f the unsaid  “h istorical 
a priori,” that is a place from  w hich the archeology o f discourse can question 
the already said at the level o f its factual existence instead of pure linguistic 
potentiality.3 The only true m iracle o f  linguistic resurrection, as Agam ben 
suggests, took place in  the case of m odern Hebrew, where a linguistic com ­
munity, after experiencing a historical traum a, placed itse lf contem porarily 
in the position o f a subject w ithin a langue that w as heretofore dead, that is it 
survived only as an archive and the corpus o f traditional texts. The community
3 c f  M. Foucault, The A rch eolog y ofK now led g e  (N ew  York: Pantheon, 1972), 126.
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emerged in  place o f the subject as a new  collective identity, a collective “w e” 
delivered from  m uteness (H ebrew  becam e a living language only after its 
speakers experienced the Holocaust, which deprived them of their own other- 
language locus, their prior linguistic identity).
This pattern of argumentation, reconstructed here very perfunctorily, pre­
cedes Agamben's final attempt at defining testimony. Undeterred in  his efforts 
to reinterpret the notion, Agam ben writes:
To bear witness is to place oneself in one's own language in the position of 
those who have lost it, to establish oneself in a living language as it were 
dead, or in a dead language as if it were living -  in any case, outside both 
the archive and the corpus of what has already been said. (161)
Note that each o f the form ulations used by the w riter indicates aporia in ­
scribed into the very structure o f testim ony (which is not equivalent, however, 
w ith its negation), which m oulds it into an articulation taking place not only 
from  a position of inability but also a logical im possibility. The im possibility 
seem s to prim arily constitute the act o f testim ony by situating the w itness 
in  the role o f the subject o f  speech “in ” language, in  a system  o f rules and 
gram m atical norm s, by establishing a relation betw een his/her act o f speech 
and the unsaid  (anom ie). Testim ony as the “possib ility o f bearing w itn ess” 
about the unsaid places itself outside the historical accumulation of discourse 
layers and m utable circum stances, initially em bodying a certain possibility 
o f language, that is the existence o f a purely potential locus o f the subject of 
speech in the face o f em pirically confirm ed im possib ility o f assum ing said 
position by any survivor. On the other hand, the existence o f that potential 
locus w ithin  language w ould legitim ize the act o f bearing w itness for those 
deprived of their language (M uslim s, victim s o f the gas cham bers), and thus 
allow  the positioning o f oneself w ith in  language “in  their place” -  voiding, 
as I understand it, the charge o f fictionalization (leveled by the more radical 
students o f Lacan, like Claude Lanzm ann) and legitim izing the testim onial 
role o f literature and, to put it m ore broadly, art. The linguistic structure of 
“bearing w itness for” does not contain and neither can it guarantee a positive 
reference to the “substance” of unsaid experience -  given that w e are dealing 
here w ith the sam e aporia that Jean-Fran^ois Lyotard accurately diagnosed 
in his ironic paraphrases of argum ents em ployed by Auschwitz negationists 
that he included in  Le Differend:
You are informed that human beings endowed with language were placed 
in a situation such that none of them is now able to tell about it. Most of 
them  disappeared then, and the survivors rarely speak about it. When
http://rcin.org.pl
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they do speak about it, their testim ony bears only upon a minute part of 
this situation. How can you know that the situation itself existed? That it 
is not the fruit of your informant's imagination? Either the situation did 
not exist as such. Or else it did exist, in which case your informant's tes­
tim ony is false, either because he or she should have disappeared, or else 
because he or she should remain silent ... To have “really seen with his own 
eyes” a gas chamber would be the condition which gives one the author­
ity to say it exists and to persuade the unbeliever. Yet it is still necessary 
to prove that the gas chamber was used to kill at the time it was seen. The 
only acceptable proof that it was used to kill is that one died from it. But 
if one is dead, one cannot testify that it is on account of the gas chamber.4
If the structure o f testim ony im plicitly contains som ething like the im ­
possibility o f bearing w itness, then, as A gam ben claim s, it is not due to the 
im possibility o f assum ing a specific existential and cognitive attitude (of b e­
ing inside the experience o f death and returning therefrom ) but rather due 
to the strictly linguistic nature o f testim ony. For Agam ben, testim ony situ­
ates itse lf from  the very beginning w ithin  a very disturbing turning point -  
incongruence -  betw een the possib ility  o f speech and the act o f  speaking, 
betw een langue and archive, being the reverse o f a situation that any subject 
o f speech can find h im self in, one that deprives h im  o f his ab ility to speak, 
to express som ething, despite him  being “in the right” to do so as a subject of 
speech situated w ithin language. The situation dem onstrates that assum ing 
the subjective position in  a language is always im plicitly related to the p o ­
tential divesting o f language, to being alienated “w ithin  it,” to the recession 
of one's ow n speech, and thanks to this structure (which allows the speaker 
to locate h im self in  the locus o f “speaking” from inside of a dead language) the 
speech of the w itness m ay bear “w itness to a tim e in which hum an beings did 
not ye t speak [...] attest to a tim e in w hich they were not ye t hum an.” (162) 
Bearing w itness, as placing oneself in language in the position o f those who 
have lost it results in  the unearthing o f the relationship betw een the langue 
and the contingency, the incidental character o f individual existence (the real 
possib ility  o f him  or her not existing at all), w hich m akes their em ergence 
in place o f the subject o f speech an absolutely singular event, one that takes 
place outside any sort o f archive or corpus o f enunciations. Contingency as the 
occurrence of language in a subject, writes Agam ben, “is different from  actual 
discourse's utterance or non-utterance, its speaking or not speaking, its pro­
duction or non-production as a statem ent. It concerns the subject's capacity
4 J.F. Lyotard, The D ifferend: Phrases in D ispute  (M inneapolis: U niversity  o f  M innesota Press, 
1988), 3.
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to have or not to have language” (145). It is not, therefore, sim ply another 
logical modality, alongside possibility, im possibility, and necessity; it is the 
“actual giving of a possibility, the w ay in which a potentiality exists as such.” 
(pp. 14 5 -14 6 ). Since “testim ony” -  the nam e given to the placem ent o f the 
subject in a certain linguistic chasm, a rift in  which the possibility o f speech is 
realized as such -  is the relationship between the possibility of speech and the 
act o f speech (enunciation) -  and not just the relationship betw een what has 
rem ained and that which w ent unsaid (the dim ension defined by the archive) 
-  then the insignificant hum an existence becom es the reason that ultim ately 
decides, tim e and tim e again, whether or not a language w ill prevail.
2.
In light of the above, it should not come as a surprise that Agam ben decided 
to associate the gesture o f bearing w itness w ith true poetic gestures, and lan ­
guage o f the poet w ith  the rem ainder, w ith  w hat rem ains (as “scatheless is 
the song”) after the test o f possibility and im possibility o f speech is through 
and that's w hy it can bear w itness for us. A lthough the author o f Homo Sacer 
quotes a sentence from  Horderlin to support his ideas o f the deep identity of 
speech in testim ony and poetry (“Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter” -  “What 
rem ains is w hat the poets found”), I w ould rather suggest to a speech by Paul 
C elan delivered at the G erm an city o f Brem en in  1958 , a speech touching, 
albeit from a different angle, upon the issue o f language as the “rem nant” that 
survived the inferno:
Only one thing remained reachable, close and secure amid all losses: lan­
guage. Yes, language. In spite o f everything, it rem ained secure against 
loss. But it had to go through its own lack of answers, through terrifying 
silence, through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech. It went 
through. It gave me no words for what was happening, but went through 
it. Went through and could resurface, ‘enriched' by it all.5
The secret o f  the poet's language lies in  the state o f regression, the loss o f 
elocution, and the ease o f expression. Language “enriched” w ith  recurring 
periods o f m uteness is the language o f  the “stutterer,” language that's con­
stantly regressing in  aphasia -  therefore this is its kenosis. To put it d iffer­
ently, it is the salvaged (rem aining, residual) im possibility o f speech w ithin 
language and the transition o f the unsayable into the act o f speech that it
5 P. Celan, "S p e e ch  on th e  O ccasion  o f  R eceiving th e  Literature Prize o f  th e  Free H an seatic  City 
o f  B rem en ” in P. Celan, C ollected Prose, tran s. R. W aldrop (N ew  York: Routledge, 2003), 34.
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incurs. Language can testify to the im possibility o f speech, because language 
itself bears w itness to/bears the stamp o f pow erlessness (m uteness), which 
is not “a rich, difficult germ ination,” but the fringe, “a distribution o f gaps, 
voids, absences, lim its, divisions,” the shift o f the interior o f the language in 
relation to its exterior.6
The traces of anomie w ithing language, as diagnosed by Celan, allow  the 
return o f the issue o f subject invalidated in  The Archeology o f Knowledge and 
approach it again via “the event o f discourse,” starting from  the aporia o f the 
possibility/im possibility o f speech, which is also referenced, albeit in  another 
way, as Agam ben remarks, by Foucault's famous question: “M any other forms 
of statem ent are to be found in the discourse of nineteenth-century doctors. 
W hat is it that links them  together? W hat n ecessity  b inds them  together? 
W hy these and not others?”7
In the relation between what is said and its taking place, it w as possible 
to bracket the subject of enunciation, since speech had already taken place. 
But the relation between language and its existence, between langue and the 
archive, demands subjectivity as that which, in its very possibility of speech, 
bears witness to an impossibility of speech. This is why subjectivity appears 
as witness; this is why it can speak for those who cannot speak. Testimony is 
a potentiality that becomes actual through an impotentiality of speech; it is, 
moreover, an impossibility that gives itself existence through a possibility of 
speaking. These two movements cannot be identified either with a subject 
or with a consciousness; yet they cannot be divided into two incommunica­
ble substances. Their inseparable intimacy is testimony (Agamben 145-6).
A s the subject o f speech and the paradoxical “subject o f language,” the poet 
-  an author par excellence -  does not emerge as a result of the expression of the 
idiom  of experience, but appears as, m ay I risk the expression, the inner locus 
of the linguistic exterior, salvaging langue in the im possibility o f speech and 
salvaging the im possibility o f speech (anomie) in the area i f  language. “Can 
we perhaps now  locate the strangeness, the place where the person w as able 
to set him self free as an -  estranged -  I?”8 Poetic testim ony is a polar opposite 
o f the expression o f the “interior o f the subject,” therefore Celan considers 
bearing w itness as structure (as “speaking for others,”fremder) to be tan ta­
mount to abandoning humanity, desubjectification, or to put it more precisely,
6 M. Foucault, The A rch eo lo g y o f  Know ledge, 119 .
7 ibid., 50.
8 P. C elan , "The M eridian” in P. Celan, C o llected  Prose, 46.
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in the w ords o f Celan him self: “going beyond w hat is hum an, stepping into 
a realm  which is turned toward the human, but uncanny.” A rt that is fam iliar 
w ith the “possibility o f strangeness” and contains traces o f “uncanniness” (das 
Unheimliche) rem ains w ell-rooted in  that particular realm .9
In the concept o f language-as-rem nant, we should also look for the “po­
tentia lity  o f speech” and the (im )possib ility  o f parole. “On the basis o f the 
gram m ar and o f the w ealth o f vocabulary available at a given period, there 
are, in  total, relatively few  things that are said,” and our fundam ental ques­
tions concerning the status o f testim ony revolve around the particular cir­
cum stances that decide the unique character o f this “non-filling o f the field 
of possible form ulations as it is opened up by the language.”10 The subjective 
position in  the field o f possib ility o f  the langue is a place, w here we happen 
upon “low ly lives reduced to ashes in  the few  phrases that have destroyed 
them,”n and whose resurrection via m eans o f linguistic analysis was, accord­
ing to Agam ben, Foucault's greatest desire (which he confessed to only once, 
in The Life o f Infamous Men). The non-filling of the field o f possible form ula­
tions (the sayable-yet-unsaid , register o f the archive) shown, as A gam ben 
writes, to the gaze shifting from  “the site o f enunciation not towards the act 
of speech, but toward langue as such: that is, o f articulating an inside and an 
outside not only in  the plane o f language and actual discourse, but also in 
the plane o f language as potentiality  o f speech” (145) decides w hether the 
enunciatory dim ension w ill be revealed, one that extends outside the system  
o f statem ents o f a realized discourse. In this case, A gam ben clearly follows 
the thoughts o f Benveniste and Foucault, for w hom  the concept of form ula­
tion as enunciation is not based on the analysis o f “the relations betw een the 
author and w hat he says (or w anted to say, or said w ithout w anting to); but 
in determ ining w hat position can and m ust be occupied by any individual if 
he is to be the subject o f it.12 The enunciative level -  to use the nomenclature 
provided by The Archeology ofKnowledge -  is “at the lim it o f language,” although 
it is not “the enigmatic, silent rem ainder that it [the language -  ir.] does not 
translate.” The enunciation defines only “the m odality o f its appearance: its 
periphery rather than its internal organization.’^3
9 ibid., 42
10  M. Foucault, The A rch eo lo g y ofKnow ledge, 119 .
11  M. Foucault, "The Life o f  Infam ous M en” in M. Foucau lt, Power, Truth, Strategy, ed . M eaghan 
M orris and Paul P atton  (Sydney: Feral Publications, 2006), 77.
12  M. Foucault, The A rch eo lo g y ofKnow ledge, 95.
13  ibid., 112 .
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A  rem arkably sim ilar thought can be found in the w ork o f  Paul Celan. 
A  poem  is the sort o f enunciation that “holds its ground on its ow n m a r­
gin . In order to endure, it con stan tly  calls and pulls its e lf  back from  an 
‘a lread y-n o -m o re ' into a ‘still-h ere ,'” the latter o f w h ich  m ay “only m ean 
speaking,” “not language as such, but respond ing and -  not ju st verbally  
-  ‘corresponding' to som ething.” From  the perspective o f  “only ... sp eak­
ing” -  the “possib ilities ... im m ersed in  the m em ory o f individual” becom e 
a language “ set free under the sign  o f  ... the lim its draw n b y  language,”14 
that is the previously discarded silent substance o f experience. The poem  
as a singular enunciation is “one person's language becom e shape,’”15 which 
transp ires only w h en  that sam e language, i f  w e look out from  its interior 
tow ards the “periphery o f enunciation,” w ithdraw s and recedes. For Celan, 
the m ost inner essence o f the poem  is its presence in  the present, “unique, 
m om entary” (being outside them  archive and corpus, respectively), being 
“lon ely” (which I understand as singularity, constituted by the p o ssib ility  
o f nonexistence) and “en route,”i® constantly in  search o f the vis-a-vis, “this 
other towards which it is heading”™ and its need of the Other. This last char­
acteristic, w hen used to describe the act o f bearing w itness, m ay translate 
to the “desire to speak to the Other,” w hich Prim o Levi, in  his conversation 
w ith  Ferdinando Cam on, illustrated in  the follow ing w ay:
Back then, in  the concentration camp, I often had a dream : I dream ed that 
I'd returned, come home to m y family, told them  about it, and nobody listened. 
The person standing in front o f me doesn't stay to hear, he turns around and 
goes away. I told this dream to m y friends in  the concentration camp, and they 
said, ”It happens to us too.”
And later I found it mentioned, in the very same way, by other survivors, 
who've written about their experiences. ... But this dream of talking about 
it w as certainly comparable to the dream of Tantalus, which was of “eat- 
ing-alm ost,” of being able to bring food to one's mouth but not succeed­
ing in biting into it. It's the dream of a prim ary need, the need to eat and 
drink. So was the need to talk about it.™




18  P. Levi, F. C am on, C onversations with Prim o Levi (M arlboro: M arlboro Press, 1989), 42
http://rcin.org.pl
TO M AS Z  M A JE W S KI t e s t i m o n y : b e t w e e n  t h e  i n s i d e .. 39
Clearly, the im possib ility  o f bearing w itn ess m ay be perceived in  a w ay 
th at is osten sib ly  very  d ifferent from  the p o ssib ility  or im p o ssib ility  o f 
having a language. W hen it com es to analyzing the cognitive positions in 
situations described by Shoshana Felm an and D ori Laub as “events w ith ­
out a w itness,” such an interpretation seem s to be an especially im portant 
alternative to solutions proposed by A gam ben. Lest w e forget, in  h is essay 
A n Event Without a Witness Laub identified three possible positions one can 
assum e tow ards the experience o f the H olocaust: bear w itn ess to oneself 
as a p art o f  a lim in al experience, being a w itn ess  testify in g  to an Other, 
being a w itness o f som eone else's testim ony. The first position, w hich car­
ries the greatest am ount o f credibility in  W estern culture, that is being an 
eyew itness o f a given event, is, according to Laub, is the m ost susceptible 
to deform ation:
In addition, it was inconceivable that any historical insider could remove 
herself sufficiently from the contaminating power of the event so as to re­
main a fully lucid, unaffected witness, that is, to be sufficiently detached 
from the inside, so as to stay entirely outside of the trapping toles, and the 
consequent identities, either of the victim or the executioner. No observer 
could remain untainted, that is, maintain an integrity -  a wholeness and 
separateness -  that could keep itself uncompromised, unharmed, by his 
or her very witnessing.19
According to the A m erican psychoanalyst, the gradual atrophying o f the 
ability to bear w itness concerns perpetrators and victim s alike, although for 
different reasons:
The perpetrators, in their attempt to rationalize the unprecedented scope 
of the destructiveness, brutally imposed upon their victims a delusional 
ideology whose grandiose coercive pressure totally excluded and elim i­
nated the possibility o f an unviolated, unencum bered, and thus sane, 
point of reference in the witness. ... It was not only the reality of the situ­
ation and the lack of responsiveness of bystanders or the world that ac­
counts for the fact that history was taking place with no witness: it was 
also the very circumstance of being inside the event that made unthinkable 
the very notion that a witness could exist, that is, someone who could step 
outside of the coercively totalitarian and dehumanizing frame of refer­
ence in  which the event was taking place, and provide an independent
19  Sh. Felm an and D. Laub, Testim ony: C rises o f  W itnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and  
H istory  (New  York— London: Routledge, 2002), 81.
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frame of reference through which the event could be observed. One might 
say that there was, thus, historically no witness to the Holocaust, either 
from outside or from inside the event.20
To explain the concept o f a w itness existing inside the murderous event, 
an event obliterating the fundam ental capability to “be towards one anoth­
er,” Laub adds that the experience o f the H olocaust seem s to us a universe 
w herein  im agining an Other w as sim ply no longer possible. “The w as no 
longer an other to w hich one could say ‘Thou' in the hope o f being heard, o f 
being recognized as a subject, o f being answered.”2i W hen one cannot even 
address an Other w ith  a “Thou,” then one cannot say “thou” even to oneself 
and therefore cannot “bear w itness to oneself.”22 V ictim s are m ute because 
their testim ony to us is an account o f exclusion from  the w orld o f hum an b e­
ings, the internalization of the non-person status. The survivors find that their 
experiences aren't com m unicable even to them selves, as speaking o f these 
events is inherently linked w ith  the loss o f one's identity or the collapse of 
the basic fram eworks o f the hum an condition that allow for self-knowledge, 
thus rendering the narrative im possible to communicate.
It is not really possible to tell the truth, to testify, from the outside. Neither 
is it possible, as we have seen, to testify from the inside. I would sug­
gest that the im possible position and the testim onial effort o f the film 
as a whole is to be, precisely, neither sim ply inside nor sim ply outside, 
but paradoxically, both inside and outside: to create a connection that did not 
exist during the w ar and does not exist today, between the inside and the 
outside -  to set them both in motion and in dialogue with one another.23
The author ponders this relationship, or, in other words, this connection 
betw een the “inside” and the “outside” using the exam ple o f Jan Karski's ac­
count of the W arsaw ghetto. Later, w hen trying to establish w hat m akes the 
strength o f the testim ony in  Lanzmann's movie, Felm an states that it “is not 
the words but the equivocal, puzzling, relation betw een words and voice, the 
interaction, that is, betw een words, voice, rhythm, melody, im ages, w riting, 
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like the unique perform ance o f a singing.”24 Testim ony is located here b e ­
tw een language and w hat's beyond it. It does not take place in the tension 
betw een the possibility and im possibility o f speech, but betw een speech and 
w hat is displaced from  it; w hat resurfaces not in  language itse lf but in  its 
pauses, inflections, intonations, in other words, as a strictly m elic sym ptom  
o f som ething m ute, extralinguistic. A gam ben treated th is d iagnosis w ith 
slight detachm ent, claim ing it “derives an aesthetic possibility from  a log i­
cal im possibility” through an illegitim ate “recourse to the m etaphor o f song.” 
(36) In Felm an and Laub's interpretation testim ony is conveyed, as we should 
strongly emphasize, by the strictly aesthetic qualities o f language -  rhythm, 
intonation, melody, dissonances, and assonances, and considering this a dan­
gerous tendency tow ards the “aestheticization o f testim ony” should not be 
treated as an exaggeration. Contrary to the authors' intentions, this aestheti­
cization is a direct consequence o f relocating the stutter, the inhum an, and 
the heterogeneous outside the realm  o f language.
Coming back to the conclusion I anticipated in the beginning of this article, 
I w ould like to say that from  Agam ben's perspective, the subject o f testim o­
nial speech m ay communicate the im possible testim ony of desubjectification, 
because both the subject o f speech and language itse lf are, to som e degree, 
constitutively fractured. In language as the area o f possibility o f speech, we 
have to -  as dem onstrated by the case of testim ony -  to learn how  to d istin­
guish im possibility as a separate part o f the field. Likewise, w e should have 
the courage to designate the indelible inhum an part in  every hum an subject. 
Only then can w e make som e sense o f the puzzling fact that “the speech o f 
the w itness bears w itness to a tim e in which hum an beings did not yet speak; 
and so the testim ony o f hum an beings attests to a tim e in  w hich they were 
not yet human.” (162)
Translation: Jan Szelqgiewicz
24 ibid., 277-278.
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